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Executive Summary 
The causal factors of accidents from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database and 
incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) database associated with failures and 
malfunctions of the various systems and components of commercial aircraft were examined for the years 
1988 to 2003 for three types of flight operations: Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121, Scheduled Part 
135, and Non-Scheduled Part 135. The aircraft systems were divided into the most frequently cited 
groups of failure or malfunction: engine or fuel system, flight control or structure, and landing gear or 
hydraulics. The remaining systems and components were grouped into the “other” category. Most 
accidents in the NTSB database have more than one causal factor cited by accident and incident 
investigators. The total number of accidents found in the NTSB database with a system/component 
failure/malfunction (SCFM) was 370, while the total number of incidents found in the FAA database  
was 7732. 
Maintenance error was a cause in 38 percent of the 179 commercial accidents with an engine or fuel 
SCFM. Some part of the engine or fuel system was said to have failed in 35 percent of the accidents, and 
component fatigue was noted in 23 percent of the accidents.  
Flight control or structural SCFM was involved in 54 of the accidents. Of these, 46 percent were 
related to maintenance errors. Manufacturing or design elements were a causal factor in 40 percent of  
the Part 121 flight control or structural malfunction accidents. A component was said to have failed in 
29 percent of the accidents, a component separated in 23 percent of the accidents, and a component 
jammed in 20 percent of the accidents.  
Of the 115 accidents with landing gear or hydraulic system malfunctions in commercial aircraft, 
28 percent were related to maintenance errors. A landing gear or hydraulic system component was said to 
have failed in 48 percent of the accidents. 
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident database was examined for two types of 
flight operation: Part 121 and Part 135, from January 1993 to March 2008. Equipment problems were the 
cause of 93 percent of the aircraft primary problem events found in ASRS. The most frequent component 
failures were turbine engine, pressurization system, hydraulic main system, flight management 
system/computer, and engine. The data was further categorized in aircraft systems. The monitoring and 
management system accounted for 14.1 percent of all failures, the propulsion system accounted for 
13.7 percent, the control surfaces accounted for 9.1 percent, the environmental control system accounted 
for 8.8 percent, and the landing gear system accounted for 7.8 percent of the total equipment failures.  
An adverse events table was updated to provide focus to the direction of the Integrated Vehicle 
Health Management Project. The table contains five types of adverse faults: incipient, slow progression, 
intermittent, cascading, and fast progression. Seventeen different example damage conditions were 
gleaned from ASRS and the NTSB databases as well as from failure modes and effects analyses abstracts. 
The severity and frequency of the damage conditions are also provided.  
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Summary 
Causal factors in aviation accidents and incidents related to system/component failure/malfunction 
(SCFM) were examined for Federal Aviation Regulation Parts 121 and 135 operations to establish future 
requirements for the NASA Aviation Safety Program’s Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) 
Project. Data analyzed includes National Transportation Safety Board (NSTB) accident data (1988 to 
2003), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) incident data (1988 to 2003), and Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) incident data (1993 to 2008). Failure modes and effects analyses were 
examined to identify possible modes of SCFM. A table of potential adverse conditions was developed to 
help evaluate IVHM research technologies. Tables present details of specific SCFM for the incidents and 
accidents. Of the 370 NTSB accidents affected by SCFM, 48 percent involved the engine or fuel system 
and 31 percent involved landing gear or hydraulic failure and malfunctions. A total of 35 percent of all 
SCFM accidents were caused by improper maintenance. Of the 7732 FAA database incidents affected by 
SCFM, 33 percent involved landing gear or hydraulics, and 33 percent involved the engine and fuel 
system. The most frequent SCFMs found in ASRS were turbine engine, pressurization system, hydraulic 
main system, flight management system and flight management computer, and engine. Because the 
IVHM Project does not address maintenance issues, and landing gear and hydraulic systems accidents are 
usually not fatal, the focus of research should be those SCFMs that occur in the engine and fuel and flight 
control and structures systems, as well as power systems.  
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Introduction 
Purpose of Study 
NASA’s Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project is one of four projects within the 
Agency’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSafe) in the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. The 
IVHM Project, which was updated August 14, 2008, conducts research to develop validated tools and 
technologies for automated detection, diagnosis, and prognosis that enable mitigation of adverse events 
during flight. Adverse events include those that arise from system, subsystem, or component faults or 
failures due to damage, degradation, or environmental hazards that occur during flight (Ref. 1).  
The purpose of this study is to review statistical data and literature from academia, industry, and other 
Government agencies to interpret and extract information about causal factors in current aircraft safety 
incidents and accidents and failure modes and effects analyses (FMEAs) that are related to the key 
research areas in IVHM. From this information, a list of potential adverse conditions was established 
against which IVHM technologies can be evaluated. This study is considered a waypoint to establish 
future requirements for the project with the following expected outcomes (Ref. 1): 
 
(1) Report and document causal factors gleaned from the analyses of the incidents and accidents 
related to IVHM utilizing the most current statistical and prognostic data available from the 
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) Project. 
(2) Report and document causal factors gleaned from FMEAs available from relevant literature. 
(3) Develop a list of potential adverse conditions against which IVHM technologies can be evaluated. 
Overview of Study Contents 
The expected outcomes for this study are addressed in sequential order. Outcome 1 is addressed in the 
NASA Analyses of NTSB and FAA Accident and Incident Data section and the NASA Analysis of ASRS 
Incident Data section; these analyses have been conducted by NASA researchers for this Key Decision 
Point. Outcome 2 is the focus of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis section, while outcome 3 is 
addressed by the Adverse Events Table. Finally, discussion and the conclusions that have been drawn are 
provided.  
The first expected outcome of this study is the results of an examination of the most recent statistical 
and prognostic incident and accident data that is available to determine the causal factors of system or 
component failures and/or malfunctions in U.S. commercial aviation accidents and incidents. The next 
two sections contain the results of two separate statistical analyses that have been conducted by NASA to 
address this expected outcome. The first statistical analysis examined publicly available National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident and incident 
data. A second statistical analysis was conducted with the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
reports as the data source. All of these data sources can be accessed using ASIAS (Ref. 2) 
NASA Analyses of National Transportation Safety Board and  
Federal Aviation Administration Accident and Incident Data 
A statistical analysis was conducted to determine the causal factors of accidents and incidents 
associated with failures or malfunctions of the various systems or components of commercial aircraft 
from 1988 to 2003. A causal factor is described as why the accident or incident happened. In determining 
the causes, the NTSB considers all facts, conditions, and circumstances associated with the accident. 
Often several causes explain why an accident occurred. For this reason, a single accident report can 
include multiple causes (Ref. 3). The safety risk is based on both accidents and incidents, which are 
defined as follows (Ref. 4): 
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Accident An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, which takes place between the 
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have 
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the 
aircraft receives substantial damage. 
 
Incident An occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which 
affects or could affect the safety of operations. 
 
In this analysis, “commercial” is defined as Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, and Non-Scheduled Part 
135 flights. Part 121 operations applies to major airlines and cargo carriers that fly large transport-
category aircraft, and Part 135 applies to commercial aircraft air carriers commonly referred to as 
commuter airlines. Prior to March 1997, Part 121 operations included aircraft with 30 or more seats. In 
March 1997, the definition of Part 121 operations changed and now includes those aircraft with 10 or 
more seats. Scheduled operation refers to “any common carriage passenger-carrying operation for 
compensation or hire conducted by an air carrier or commercial operator for which the certificate holder 
or its representative offers in advance of the departure location, departure time, and arrival location.” A 
non-scheduled operation refers to “any operation for compensation or hire in which the departure time, 
departure location, and arrival location are specifically negotiated with the customer” (Ref. 5).  
The source for accident data is the NTSB Aviation Accident and Incident Data System, while the 
source for incident data is the FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System. Although both databases contain 
both accident and incident data, the FAA has primary investigative responsibility for incidents and the 
NTSB is the authority for accident investigation.  
For each accident and incident, the system affected by the system/component failure/malfunction 
(SCFM) was determined (see Tables 1 and 2). In some events, multiple systems were affected, and in 
these cases the first system affected was selected. For example, if an electrical malfunction preceded an 
engine fire, that event was categorized under electrical. 
The NTSB database includes causal factors for each accident that occurs within the United States. 
The aircraft systems identified in Table 1 were divided into four system groups: engine or fuel system; 
flight control or structure;  landing gear or hydraulic; and instrumentation/communication/navigation, 
electrical, other, unknown. The first three groups account for the most frequent SCFM-related events.  
 
TABLE 1.—FREQUENCY OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION 
ACCIDENTS GROUPED BY SYSTEM AFFECTED AND BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
System Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled  
Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Parts 121 and 135 
combined 
Engine  36 (33%)  12 (36%)  111 (49%)  159 (43%) 
Landing gear  23 (21%)  10 (30%)  64 (28%)  97 (26%) 
Flight control  10 (9%)  3 (9%)  9 (4%)  22 (6%) 
Electrical  8 (7%)  1 (3%)  12 (5%)  21 (6%) 
Fuel  4 (4%)  3 (9%)  13 (6%)  20 (5%) 
Hydraulic  9 (8%)  2 (6%)  7 (3%)  18 (5%) 
Structure  5 (5%)  1 (3%)  7 (3%)  13 (4%) 
Other  8 (7%)  1 (3%)  4 (2%)  13 (4%) 
Instrumentation/ 
communication/ 
navigation 
 5 (5%)  0 (0%)  0 (0%)  5 (1%) 
Unknown  1 (1%)  0 (0%)  1 (0%)  2 (1%) 
Total accidents  109  33  228  370 
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TABLE 2.—FREQUENCY OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION INCIDENTS  
GROUPED BY SYSTEM AFFECTED AND BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
System Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled  
Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Parts 121 and 
135 combined 
Engine 1384 (28%) 486 (31%) 349 (29%) 2219 (29%) 
Landing gear 990 (20%) 509 (33%) 558 (46%) 2057 (27%) 
Other 615 (12%) 135 (9%) 47 (4%) 797 (10%) 
Flight control 431 (9%) 43 (3%) 28 (2%) 502 (6%) 
Hydraulic 414 (8%) 57 (4%) 45 (4%) 516 (7%) 
Fuel 215 (4%) 80 (5%) 54 (4%) 349 (5%) 
Structure 214 (4%) 80 (5%) 49 (4%) 343 (4%) 
Comfort systems 246 (5%) 54 (4%) 20 (2%) 320 (41%) 
Electrical 191 (4%) 64 (4%) 47 (4%) 302 (4%) 
Pressurization 174 (4%) 15 (1%) 8 (1%) 197 (3%) 
Instrumentation/communication/navigation 83 (2%) 34 (2%) 13 (1%) 130 (2%) 
Total incidents 4957 1557 1218 7732 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.—FREQUENCY OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION ACCIDENT 
CHARACTERISTIC BY SYSTEM GROUP AND BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
System group Accident 
characteristics 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled  
Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Parts 121 and 
135 combined 
Engine or fuel system 
Total accidents 40 15 124 179 
Fatal accidents 4 (10%) 3 (20%) 37 (30%) 44 (25%) 
Total fatalities 151 33 92 276 
Flight control or 
structure 
Total accidents 15 4 16 35 
Fatal accidents 7 (47%) 1 (25%) 4 (25%) 12 (34%) 
Total fatalities 279 14 4 297 
Landing gear or 
hydraulic 
Total accidents 32 12 71 115 
Fatal accidents 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
Total fatalities 0 5 0 5 
Instrument/ 
communication/ 
navigation, electrical, 
other, unknown 
Total accidents 22 2 17 41 
Fatal accidents 5 (23%) 0 6 (35%) 11 (27%) 
Total fatalities 347 0 13 360 
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Further analysis of the SCFM accidents compared the severity of the four system categories. Table 3 
compares the four system groups’ fatal accidents and fatality rates. Although the landing gear or hydraulic 
system category has 115 total accidents, only one was a fatal accident with five fatalities. In contrast, 
within the engine or fuel system category, 25 percent of the total accidents were fatal with 276 fatalities. 
The flight control or structural systems category has 40 accidents, yet 12 were fatal accidents, or 
30 percent with 297 fatalities. Even though flight control/structural SCFM accidents were less frequent 
than landing gear/hydraulic SCFMs, the outcomes were far worse.  
The next four tables list the causal factors that are linked to the SCFMs for the four system groups 
identified in Table 3. Some of the causal factors specify the problem with the component (corroded, 
fractured, separated, etc.), and others address errors by individuals (maintenance personnel) or groups of 
people (the manufacturer, the company, or operator) or regulatory deficiencies (the FAA). As stated 
earlier, most events have more than one causal factor. 
Each table includes the number of accidents within the particular group of systems; the percentages 
given are based on the number of accidents, not on the number of causal factors. Most accidents contain 
more than one causal factor. For those events for which “unknown” is listed in the table as a causal factor, 
no other causal factors appear in the table for that event. In other words, for those 21 accidents, the cause 
of the failure or malfunction in completely unknown. 
In Table 4, 39 percent of engine or fuel SCFMs in commercial aircraft were related to maintenance 
errors; 42 percent were in Part 121 operations, 20 percent in Scheduled Part 135 and 40 percent in Non-
Scheduled Part 135. Some part of the engine or fuel system failed in 35 percent of  
the accidents, and fatigue was noted in 23 percent of the accidents. A component separated from its 
normal position in 14 percent of the accidents. Manufacturing or design issues were cited much more 
frequently in Part 121 or Scheduled Part 135 than in Non-Scheduled Part 135 accidents. 
Flight control or structural SCFM causal factors are shown in Table 5. Maintenance errors were a 
causal factor in 46 percent of the accidents; Part 121 accounted for 53 percent of these, 50 percent in 
Scheduled Part 135, and 38 percent in Non-Scheduled Part 135. Manufacturing or design elements were 
named as a cause in 40 percent of the Part 121 flight control or structural SCFM accidents. A component 
failed in 29 percent of the accidents, a component separated in 23 percent of the accidents, and a 
component jammed in 20 percent of the accidents. 
Landing gear or hydraulic SCFMs are shown in Table 6. Maintenance errors were a causal factor in 
28 percent of the accidents; Part 121 accounted for 25 percent of these, 33 percent in Scheduled Part 135, 
and 28 percent in Non-Scheduled Part 135. A component failed in 48 percent of the accidents, component 
fatigue occurred in 18 percent of the accidents, and there was a loss of hydraulic fluid in 15 percent of the 
accidents. In 33 percent of Scheduled Part 135 accidents a component was inoperative. Manufacturing or 
design issues were cited more frequently in Part 121 or Scheduled Part 135 than in Non-Scheduled Part 
135 accidents. 
The remaining SCFMs are shown in Table 7. Maintenance errors were a causal factor in 32 percent of 
the accidents; Part 121 accounted for 41 percent of these, 50 percent in Scheduled Part 135, and 17 percent 
in Non-Scheduled Part 135. There was an electrical failure in 17 percent of the accidents, wire chafed/arcing 
in 15 percent of the accidents, and an electrical short in 12 percent of the accidents.  
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TABLE 4.—FREQUENCY OF CAUSAL FACTORS OF ENGINE OR FUEL SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/ 
MALFUNCTION (SCFM) ACCIDENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Causal factors of engine or fuel SCFM Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled  
Part 135 
Non-Scheduled  
Part 135 
Parts 121 and 
135 combined 
Total engine or fuel SCFM accidents 40 15 124 179 
Maintenance related 17 (42%) 3 (20%) 49 (40%) 69 (39%) 
Component failure 18 (45%) 5 (33%) 39 (31%) 62 (35%) 
Component fatigue 8 (20%) 3 (20%) 30 (24%) 41 (23%) 
Component separated 6 (15%) 3 (20%) 16 (13%) 25 (14%) 
Manufacturing/design 9 (22%) 3 (20%) 8 (6%) 20 (11%) 
Component fractured 3 (8%) 1 (7%) 16 (13%) 20 (11%) 
Component disconnected 3 (6%) 1 (7%) 15 (12%) 19 (11%) 
Oil deprivation 1 (2%) 1 (7%) 13 (10%) 15 (8%) 
Component worn 2 (5%) 1 (7%) 8 (6%) 11 (6%) 
Unknown 3 (8%) 0 (0%) 7 (6%) 10 (6%) 
Ignition erratic 1 (2%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 8 (4%) 
Incorrect, improper, or inadequate component 0 (0%) 1 (7%) 7 (6%) 8 (4%) 
Component loose 0 (0%) 1 (7%) 6 (5%) 7 (4%) 
Company/operator error 2 (5%) 0 (0%) 5 (4%) 7 (4%) 
Component corroded 1 (2%) 1 (7%) 5 (4%) 7 (4%) 
Component deteriorated 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 6 (5%) 7 (4%) 
Fuel leak 2 (5%) 1 (7%) 3 (2%) 6 (3%) 
Overspeed/overtemperature 1 (2%) 1 (7%) 3 (2%) 5 (3%) 
Overtorque/undertorque 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (4%) 5 (3%) 
Federal Aviation Administration 1 (2%) 2 (13%) 1 (1%) 4 (2%) 
Component malfunction 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 3 (2%) 4 (2%) 
Component ruptured/severed 2 (5%) 0 (0%) 2 (2%) 4 (2%) 
Loss of oil pressure 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 3 (2%) 4 (2%) 
Component inoperative 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 2 (2%) 3 (2%) 
Component bent 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Component movement restricted 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Bolt not secured 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Burned piston 0 (0%) 1 (7%) 1 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Mechanical binding of component 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Wiring chafed/arcing 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Fouled spark plug 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
Magneto jammed 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
Seal not installed 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
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Flight control or structural SCFM causal factors are shown in Table 5. Maintenance errors were a 
causal factor in 46 percent of the accidents; Part 121 accounted for 53 percent of these, 50 percent in 
Scheduled Part 135, and 38 percent in Non-Scheduled Part 135. Manufacturing or design elements were 
named as a cause in 40 percent of the Part 121 flight control or structural SCFM accidents. A component 
failed in 29 percent of the accidents, a component separated in 23 percent of the accidents, and a 
component jammed in 20 percent of the accidents. 
Landing gear or hydraulic SCFMs are shown in Table 6. Maintenance errors were a causal factor in 
28 percent of the accidents; Part 121 accounted for 25 percent of these, 33 percent in Scheduled Part 135 
and 28 percent in Non-Scheduled Part 135. A component failed in 48 percent of the accidents, component 
fatigue occurred in 18 percent of the accidents, and there was a loss of hydraulic fluid in 15 percent of the 
accidents. In 33 percent of Scheduled Part 135 accidents a component was inoperative. Manufacturing or 
design issues were cited more frequently in Part 121 or Scheduled Part 135 than in Non-Scheduled Part 
135 accidents. 
The remaining SCFMs are shown in Table 7. Maintenance errors were a causal factor in 32 percent of 
the accidents; Part 121 accounted for 41 percent of these, 50 percent in Scheduled Part 135, and 17 percent 
in Non-Scheduled Part 135. There was an electrical failure in 17 percent of the accidents, wire chafed/arcing 
in 15 percent of the accidents, and electrical short in 12 percent of the accidents.  
 
 
 
TABLE 5.—FREQUENCY OF CAUSAL FACTORS OF FLIGHT CONTROL OR STRUCTURAL SYSTEM/ 
COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (SCFM) ACCIDENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Causal factors of flight control  
or structural SCFM 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled  
Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Parts 121 and 
135 combined 
Total flight control or structural SCFM accidents 15 4 16 35 
Maintenance related 8 (53%) 2 (50%) 6 (38%) 16 (46%) 
Component failure 3 (20%) 2 (50%) 5 (31%) 10 (29%) 
Component separated 4 (27%) 1 (25.0%) 3 (19%) 8 (23%) 
Manufacturing/design 6 (40%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 7 (20%) 
Component jammed 2 (13%) 1 (25%) 4 (25%) 7 (20%) 
Component inoperative 2 (13%) 0 (0%) 3 (19%) 5 (14%) 
Federal Aviation Administration 3 (20%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 4 (11%) 
Company/operator error 2 (13%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 3 (9%) 
Component corroded 2 (13%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 3 (9%) 
Component fatigue 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 2 (12%) 3 (9%) 
Unknown 3 (20%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (9%) 
Screws/bolts not secured 1 (7%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 
Component fractured 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 2 (6%) 
Elevator control movement restricted 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 2 (6%) 
Elevator trim/tab control disconnected 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 2 (6%) 
False indication 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 
Inadequate lubrication 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 
Jackscrew assembly worn 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 
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TABLE 6.—FREQUENCY OF CAUSAL FACTORS OF LANDING GEAR OR HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/COMPONENT 
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (SCFM) ACCIDENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Causal factors of landing gear  
or hydraulic SCFM 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled  
Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Parts 121 and 
135 combined 
Total landing gear or hydraulic SCFM accidents 32 12 71 115 
Component failure 18 (56%) 3 (25%) 34 (48%) 55 (48%) 
Maintenance related 8 (25%) 4 (33%) 20 (28%) 32 (28%) 
Component fatigue 7 (22%) 2 (17%) 12 (17%) 21 (18%) 
Hydraulic fluid loss 8 (25%) 3 (25%) 6 (8%) 17 (15%) 
Component fractured 4 (12%) 1 (8%) 8 (11%) 13 (11%) 
Manufacturing/design 6 (19%) 2 (17%) 4 (6%) 12 (10%) 
Component inoperative 3 (9%) 4 (33%) 3 (4%) 10 (9%) 
Component overload 1 (3%) 1 (8%) 4 (6%) 6 (5%) 
Component collapsed 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 4 (6%) 5 (4%) 
Component frozen 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 4 (6%) 5 (4%) 
Component separated 1 (3%) 1 (8%) 3 (4%) 5 (4%) 
Federal Aviation Administration 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 3 (4%) 4 (3%) 
False indication 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 3 (4%) 4 (3%) 
Unknown 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 3 (4%) 4 (3%) 
Component corroded 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (4%) 3 (3%) 
Component jammed 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 2 (3%) 3 (3%) 
Component malfunction 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (4%) 3 (3%) 
Gear switch movement restricted 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 2 (2%) 
Component disconnected 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (3%) 2 (2%) 
Component vibration 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 2 (2%) 
Mechanical binding of component 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 1 (1%) 2 (2%) 
Company/operator surveillance 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
Bolt sheared 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
Brakes overheated 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
Gear strut washer worn 0 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
Nose gear strut underinflated 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
Tires underinflated 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
Wiring chafed/arcing 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
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TABLE 7.—FREQUENCY OF CAUSAL FACTORS OF OTHERa SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/ 
MALFUNCTION (SCFM) ACCIDENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Cause of other SCFM Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled  
Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Parts 121 and 
135 combined 
Total other SCFM accidents 22 2 17 41 
Maintenance related 9 (41%) 1 (50%) 3 (17%) 13 (32%) 
Electrical failure 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 6 (35%) 7 (17%) 
Wiring chafed/arcing 3 (14%) 1 (50%) 2 (12%) 6 (15%) 
Manufacturing/design 4 (18%) 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 5 (12%) 
Component failure 3 (14%) 0 (0%) 2 (12%) 5 (12%) 
Electrical short 4 (18%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 5 (12%) 
Company/operator error 2 (9%) 1 (50%) 1 (6%) 4 (10%) 
Unknown 2 (9%) 0 (0%) 2 (12%) 4 (10%) 
Federal Aviation Administration 1 (4%) 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 2 (5%) 
Battery discharged 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (12%) 2 (5%) 
Hazardous material 2 (9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (5%) 
Alternator belt disconnected 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (2%) 
Alternator wiring disconnected 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (2%) 
Alternator inoperative 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (2%) 
Anti-ice system inoperative 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (2%) 
Auxiliary power unit (APU) 
combustor cap drain line clogged 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
APU malfunction 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Attitude indicator malfunctioned 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Autopilot servo frozen 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Galley elevator drive shaft 
fatigue/failure 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Heater over temperature 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 1 (2%) 
Hydraulic fluid loss 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Oxygen leak 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
Wiring not secured 0 (0%) 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 
aOther includes electrical, instrumentation/communication/navigation, anti-ice/deice system, APU, cargo fire, galley, 
heating, oxygen, pressurization, warning systems, vacuum pump, and unknown. 
 
NASA Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data  
This section examines the composition of SCFM incidents as reported in the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a voluntary, nonpunitive, self-reporting system administered by 
NASA Ames Research Center that includes incident reports submitted by members of the flightcrew and 
other people working in the aviation industry (Ref. 2). The ASRS reports do not represent an unbiased 
sample of aviation incidents, and the results presented here should not be considered statistically 
representative, but rather informational in nature.  
Data used in this analysis are from the years January 1993 through March 2008. While the ASRS 
online database includes incidents starting in 1988, information on which Federal Aviation Regulation 
(FAR) flight operation the incident occurred during is available only beginning in 1993. Because other 
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flight operations, such as Part 91 (general aviation), may have substantially different data compared with 
Parts 121 and 135, it was decided to use only those years for which FAR part was known (1993 to 2008). 
During this time period, there were 60 380 incident reports for Part 121 operation and 6151 incident 
reports for Part 135 operation. Each ASRS incident report lists the primary problem (or causal factor), 
and, if applicable, the component involved. While this categorization is performed by the experts at 
ASRS, the component data was further categorized into groups based on aircraft subsystems.  
To obtain information relevant to SCFM, the ASRS Web tool was used to query the database. The 
initial selection criterion was incidents in which the primary problem was “aircraft.” The Web tool allows 
the user to export the results to an Excel file, and relevant information such as the FAR Part and Primary 
Problem were kept. Because the Web tool’s data export function only includes those fields that can be 
queried using the tool, component information was later obtained through permission of the ASRS team 
at NASA Ames Research Center. These data were provided in a spreadsheet with only the component and 
incident report number (ACN), and were matched to the exported data using the ACN. After combining 
the data in one file, the aircraft system categorization was added, and SAS software was used to perform 
the analysis. 
Primary Problems of Incidents 
ASRS identifies the most significant factor of the incident and includes it under the category Primary 
problem. Table 8 shows the frequency of different primary problems or causal factors of incidents from 
January 1993 to March 2008 for both Part 121 and Part 135 operations. It must be noted that not every 
incident report has an identified primary problem. Therefore, the number of incidents shown in Table 8 
are less than the total of 66 531 incidents contained in the database for the given time period. 
 
 
TABLE 8.—FREQUENCIES OF PRIMARY PROBLEM BY FLIGHT OPERATION CATEGORY 
Primary problem Operation category 
Part 121 Part 135 Parts 121 and 
135 combined 
Flight crew human performance 20378 (37%) 3181 (56%) 23559 (39%) 
Aircraft 12179 (22%) 1211 (21%) 13390 (22%) 
Air traffic control (ATC) human performance 7811 571 8382 
Maintenance human performance 4500 102 4602 
Company 2947 80 3027 
Weather 1865 221 2086 
Passenger human performance 1349 2 1351 
Airport 1132 136 1268 
Chart or publication 888 40 928 
Environmental factor 513 35 548 
Federal Aviation Administration 375 38 413 
Navigational facility 350 28 378 
Airspace structure 247 25 272 
Cabin crew human performance 230 0 230 
ATC facility 108 9 117 
Total 54872 (100%) 5679 (100%) 605551 (100%) 
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The aircraft primary problem category is the second most frequent primary problem (causal factor) in 
both Parts 121 and 135 incidents containing 22 percent of all primary problems. It occurs more frequently 
than all other primary problems combined excluding the flight crew human performance category. Of 
interest to the IVHM Project is the aircraft category because it contains incident causal factors related to 
SCFM. ASRS reports include more specific descriptions of the type of problem in the aircraft category. 
Table 9 shows a further breakdown of the aircraft primary problem category into different types of 
subcategories. The most frequent subcategory cited is the equipment problem subcategory.  
The numbers reflected in Table 9 are the number of ASRS incident reports citing each of these 
problem subcategories. For example, there were 12 395 reports that listed the primary problem as being 
aircraft and the type of aircraft problem being equipment problem for the combined Parts 121 and 135. 
During some incidents, multiple components failed in succession. Later in this study, the tables will 
reflect higher numbers because of multiple component failures in a single report. Separately and 
combined, equipment problems account for approximately 93 percent of incidents whose primary factor 
was aircraft for both FAR Parts 121 and 135. A closer look at the equipment problem subcategory is 
presented next. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9.—SUBCATEGORY FREQUENCIES OF THE PRIMARY PROBLEM: 
AIRCRAFT BY FLIGHT OPERATION CATEGORY 
Subcategory Operation category 
Part 121 Part 135 Parts 121 and 
135 combined 
Equipment problem 11268 (93%) 1127 (93%) 12395 (93%) 
Nonadherence 164  31  195  
Airspace violation 5  0  5  
Altitude deviation 203  11  214  
Cabin event 44  1  45  
Conflict 77  10  87  
Excursion 2  1  3  
Ground encounter 4  0  4  
Incursion 2  1  3  
Inflight encounter 62  9  71 
Maintenance problem 15  0  15  
Other anomaly 325  20  345 
Other spatial deviation 8  0  8  
Total 12179 (100%) 1211 (100%) 13390 (100%) 
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Aircraft SCFM Analysis 
Most ASRS incident reports include a list of which components failed during the occurrence. 
Unfortunately, because ASRS is voluntarily reported, not all reports included the same amount of detail. 
A small number of those reports listing the primary problem as aircraft were excluded because they did 
not state which components were affected. For the remainder of this section, all results are based only on 
reports that list the primary problem as aircraft and include specific component failures. The data 
presented shows FAR Parts 121 and 135 combined. 
The top 20 most frequent individual component failures can be seen in Table 10. The components are 
labeled as they were listed in ASRS and any acronyms can be found in the appendix of this document. 
One difficulty with this study was the lack of clarity in the reports concerning engine failures. Although 
many pilots and ASRS officials were very specific in noting exactly which component of the engine 
failed, others just listed “engine” or “turbine engine” as having failed without providing any more detail.  
The top 10 failures in Table 10 account for 22 percent of all of the equipment failures in the ASRS 
incident reports. In the incident reports, 463 different component failures were cited. 
 
 
 
TABLE 10.—MOST FREQUENT COMPONENT FAILURES OR MALFUNCTIONS 
Component Frequency of failure  
or malfunction 
Turbine engine 752 
Pressurization system 351 
Hydraulic main system 274 
Flight management system/flight management computer 267 
Engine 259 
Autopilot 241 
Air conditioning and pressurization 192 
Flap/slat control system 175 
Gear extend/retract mechanism 174 
Trailing edge flap control 170 
Main gear tire 165 
Pressurization control system 162 
Indicating and warning-landing gear 142 
Air conditioning distribution system 130 
Nose gear 128 
Cockpit window 128 
Hydraulic system 127 
Trailing edge flap 124 
Ground proximity warning system (GPWS) 120 
Aircraft logbook 105 
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Aircraft System Category Failures 
To provide an alternative look at the incident data, the component failures were later grouped by 
aircraft system. Then the systems were ranked in order of frequency within the new subcategories. Shown 
in Table 11, the top five systems cause 54 percent of all aircraft equipment failures during incidents. 
Those systems are monitoring and management, propulsion, control surfaces, environmental control, and 
landing gear. Some ASRS incident reports included multiple failures, and that is why 12 772 component 
failures came from 10 121 reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 11.—FREQUENCIES OF COMPONENT FAILURES/MALFUNCTIONS GROUPED BY SYSTEM 
Aircraft system System description SCFM 
frequency 
Monitoring and 
management 
Any component or system that monitors the aircraft status and functions and 
relays them to the pilots; centralized control of complex systems including health 
monitoring 
1801 
Propulsion Propulsion system components 1754 
Control surfaces Moving surface used for attitude, lift, and drag control 1166 
Environmental control Provides air supply, thermal control cabin pressurization, avionics cooling, 
smoke detection, and fire suppression 
1127 
Landing gear Components that provide support on the ground and allow taxiing, takeoff and 
landing 
1003 
Navigation Determination of the position on or above the surface of the Earth; also collision 
avoidance including navigation around other aircraft and avoidance of terrain 
988 
Electrical/power Includes power generation, distribution protection, and storage 933 
Hydraulics/pneumatics Any systems using a fluid or gas to transmit force; includes actuators 671 
Automated flight control Automated means of flight control 543 
Structures The fuselage, empennage, wings; the control surfaces and landing gear have been 
subcategorized 
543 
Fuel Any portion of the fuel system 414 
Miscellaneous Anything that does fit into any of the other categories 404 
Communication Connects the flight deck to the ground and the flight deck to the passengers 362 
Oil Oil lubrication and components 337 
Brakes Landing gear braking system 287 
Furnishings and 
equipment 
Aircraft seats, cargo, entertainment, etc.  263 
Icing Anti-icing or deicing systems 140 
Weather Weather radar/information and lightning detectors 36 
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Monitoring and Management 
The monitoring and management category is of particular importance to the IVHM Project because of 
its focus on the health management of aircraft components and systems. This category includes any 
component or system that monitors the aircraft status and functions and relays them to the pilots as well as 
centralized control of complex systems including health monitoring. While hardware features have 
extensive background research and testing of failures, monitoring and management failures may be harder 
to predict and test. Information given by United Airlines in reference to Boeing 777 aircraft indicates that 
health monitoring significantly reduces mechanical problems, but increases software problems (Ref. 6). 
More research is needed to ensure that mechanical problems are not replaced by software problems (Ref. 6).  
Included in Table 12 are the top 20 most frequent specific component failures of the monitoring and 
management system. This category contains 75 different types of component failure. These failures 
account for 64 percent of all monitoring and management system failures. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 12.—TOP 20 MOST FREQUENT SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/ 
MALFUNCTIONS (SCFMs) OF MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT  
SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Component SCFM frequency  
Landing gear indicating and warning 142 
Landing gear indicating system 98 
Fire/overheat warning 95 
Cargo compartment fire/overheat warning 86 
Door warning system 83 
Fuel quantity pressure indication 81 
Powerplant fire/overheat warning 77 
Oil pressure indication 65 
Air data computer 57 
Altimeter 52 
Airspeed indicator 39 
Flight and navigation systems indicating and warning 39 
Pneumatic system indicating and warning 39 
Fuel system indicating and warning 37 
Primary flight display 29 
Oil contents indication 28 
Attitude indicator 26 
Engine pressure ratio indication 26 
APU fire/overheat warning 25 
Engine indications 25 
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Propulsion 
The propulsion system category contains SCFMs of 82 different components and systems. Shown in 
Table 13 are the top 20 most frequent specific component failures of the propulsion system. These 
failures account for 88 percent of all propulsion SCFMs. The turbine engine and engine components 
account for 58 percent of all the cited propulsion SCFMs. Again, these components skew the results 
because of lack of detail in the reports. The rest of the propulsion SCFMs were actually remarkably 
specific and diverse. Without engine and turbine engine, most of the propulsion components do not fail a 
significant amount of the times.  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 13.—TOP 20 MOST FREQUENT SYSTEM/ 
COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTIONS (SCFMs)  
OF PROPULSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Component SCFM frequency  
Turbine engine 752 
Engine 259 
Compressor 73 
Throttle/power level 69 
Cowling 50 
Turbine assembly 48 
Turbine engine thrust reverser 31 
Engine air starter 27 
Compressor bearing 26 
Reciprocating engine assembly 24 
Thrust reverser control 24 
Fan blade 23 
Turbine assembly blade 23 
Engine air 22 
Engine-driven pump 22 
Reverser actuator 16 
Compressor blade 15 
Propeller autofeather system 15 
Fan reverser 12 
Propeller blade 11 
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Control Surfaces 
The control surface system category contains SCFMs of 33 different components and systems. Shown 
in Table 14 are the top 20 most frequent specific component failures of the control surface system. These 
failures account for 94 percent of all control surface SCFMs. The flap/slat control system, trailing edge 
flap control, and trailing edge flap components account for 40 percent of all the cited control surface  
SCFMs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 14.—TOP 20 MOST FREQUENT SYSTEM/ 
COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTIONS (SCFMs)  
OF CONTROL SURFACES SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Component SCFM frequency  
Flap/slat control system 175 
Trailing edge flap control 170 
Trailing edge flap 124 
Rudder control system 82 
Leading edge slat 77 
Horizontal stabilizer trim 73 
Aileron control system 50 
Elevator control system 49 
Elevator trim system 43 
Speedbrake/spoiler 42 
Spoiler system 41 
Leading edge flap 32 
Horizontal stabilizer control 26 
Rudder 22 
Rudder trim system 19 
Elevator 18 
Elevator feel system 15 
Aileron trim system 14 
Aileron 13 
Horizontal stabilizer 10 
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Environmental Controls 
The environmental control system had the fourth highest impact on the incidents reported from 1993 
to 2008. The environmental control system category contains SCFMs of 16 different components and 
systems shown in Table 15. The pressurization system, air conditioning and pressurization, pressurization 
control system, and air conditioning distribution system components account for 74 percent of all the 
cited environmental controls SCFMs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 15.—SYSTEM/COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTION 
(SCFM) OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS SYSTEM 
COMPONENTS  
Component SCFM frequency 
Pressurization system 351 
Air conditioning and pressurization 192 
Pressurization control system 162 
Air conditioning distribution system 130 
Aircraft cooling system 76 
Oxygen system/crew 52 
Pressurization outflow valve 49 
Air conditioning compressor 40 
Oxygen system/passenger 19 
Aircraft heating system 17 
Fire extinguishing indication system 14 
Fire protection system 10 
Aircraft auto temperature system 6 
Oxygen system/portable 5 
Oxygen system/general 3 
Other fire extinguishing system 1 
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Landing Gear 
The landing gear system also contributed to a significant number of failures. The landing gear system 
category contains SCFMs of 23 different components and systems. Shown in Table 16 are the top 20 
most frequent specific component failures of the landing gear system. The gear extend/retract mechanism, 
main gear tire, and nose gear components account for 47 percent of all the cited landing gear SCFMs .  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 16.—TOP 20 MOST FREQUENT SYSTEM/ 
COMPONENT FAILURE/MALFUNCTIONS (SCFMs) 
 OF LANDING GEAR SYSTEM COMPONENTS  
Component Frequency of 
failure/malfunction 
Gear extend/retract mechanism 174 
Main gear tire 165 
Nose gear 128 
Nose wheel steering 90 
Main gear 68 
Main gear door 58 
Landing gear 44 
Nose gear tire 37 
Gear down lock 34 
Nose gear door 33 
Wheels/tires/brakes 26 
Gear up lock 24 
Tires 23 
Main gear wheel 22 
Gear lever/selector 19 
Emergency extension system 18 
Nose gear wheel 16 
Supplemental landing gear 12 
Wheel assemblies 5 
Gear ski 2 
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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FMEA is a method that systematically examines individual system components to assess risk and 
reliability. It is a bottom-up approach and follows an inductive logic to determine critical component 
failures and their consequences. The FMEA starts with decomposition of the system into subsystems and 
finally into individual components. Ways in which each component can potentially fail, called failure 
modes, are then recorded and evaluated separately to determine what effect they have at the component 
level and the system level.  
As part of the system analysis task, FMEA data from literature has been examined to identify and 
document failure modes of aerospace components/subsystems as they relate to the adverse conditions 
documented in the adverse events table. In most cases, the actual FMEA data and quantitative values regarding 
criticality were not included in the reviewed literature documents due to the sensitivity of the information. 
However, we have captured critical failure modes regarding a number of aerospace components and 
subsystems. Examples include component failure mechanisms in wiring components such as wire chafing, 
stalling in turbomachinery, solder or joint problems for electronic components, and spalling of engine bearings. 
Where appropriate, this information is incorporated into the adverse events table (Table 17).  
Adverse Events Table 
The purpose of the adverse event type table is to provide focus to the direction of the IVHM Project. As 
the IVHM Project matures and future technologies and trends become clear, this initial set of adverse event 
types and candidate examples will change. These adverse event types are categorized into five classes based 
on the overall remaining useful life of the affected system, subsystem, or component: incipient failures, 
slow-progression failures, intermittent faults, cascading faults, and fast-progression failures.  
The systems analysis team has updated the initial adverse events table by collecting data gleaned from 
findings within the ASRS and NTSB databases, in addition to FMEA abstracts. The intent was to call 
attention to damage conditions that occur frequently while providing insight on their severity and 
detectability. Depending on the nature of the damage condition, there are scenarios in which they may 
apply to more than one adverse event type. For example, a software fault could lead to a fast-progression 
fault as in the case of a stack overflow, or a slow-progression fault, as in the case of a memory leak. In 
addition, improper maintenance is a key issue that was omitted from the table but is applicable within all 
event types. Primarily, the majority of the accidents were derived from the NTSB database, and the 
incidents were extracted from the ASRS database. 
Because the IVHM Project does not address maintenance issues, and Landing Gear and Hydraulic 
systems accidents are usually not fatal, the focus of research should be those SCFMs that occur in the 
engine/fuel and flight control/structures systems as well as power systems. Some examples of damage 
conditions for these systems can be found in the Adverse Events Table (Table 17). Of particular interest are 
 
• Icing conditions in propulsion systems 
• Turbine engine bearings failures 
• Fatigue cracks on metallic airframe structures 
• Delamination in composites 
• Ball-jam in electromechanical actuator (EMA) 
• Aileron, rudder or control surface faults 
• Fuel system faults 
• Engine stall/faults in turbomachinery 
• Power electronics/power system faults 
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TABLE 17.—ADVERSE EVENTS AND EXAMPLE DAMAGE CONDITIONS WITH SEVERITY AND FREQUENCY 
Adverse event type Example damage condition Severity (frequency) 
Incipient Fault:  
Hard to detect and differentiate due 
to extremely slow degradation in 
performance 
1. Icing conditions in propulsion system 1. Accident (6) 
2. Fault of power electronics 
• Power drivers 
• Power supplies 
• Switching transistors 
• Electronics packaging 
• Electronic circuit boards 
2. Accident (11) 
Incident (417) 
 
3. Turbine engine bearings 
• Fatigue spallation  
3. Accident (4)  
Slow Progression Fault:  
Very hard to detect and gradual 
degradation in performance 
4. Fatigue cracks on metallic airframe structure 4. Accident (13) 
Incident (343) 
5. Delamination in composites 5. Accident (2) 
6. Ball-jam in EMA 
• Hydraulic actuator failures 
6. Accident (18) 
Incident (516) 
7. Air conditioning and pressurization faults 7. Incident (408) 
8. Oil and lubrication system failures 8. Incident (463) 
Intermittent Fault:  
Fault does not degrade but instead is 
a recurring hard fault that comes and 
goes, for example, a signal 
conducted via a loose connector  
9. Wire chafing resulting in an electrical short due to an 
unexpected ground path 
9. Accident (9)  
Cascading Fault:  
Faults that may have a single root 
cause yet progress to create faults in 
other systems, subsystems, or 
components 
10. Power system faults resulting in wide-spread systemic 
issues 
• Electrical distribution problems 
10. Accident (10) 
Incident (738) 
11. Aileron, rudder, or control surface (elevator) faults 11. Accident (22) 
Incident (620) 
12. Instrumentation, communication, and navigation  12. Accident (5) 
Incident (1278) 
13. Fuel system faults 13. Accident (20) 
Incident (349) 
Fast Progression Fault:  
Limited precursor signature but 
rapid degradation 
14. Engine stall/faults in turbomachinery 14. Accident (52) 
Incident (2312) 
15. Landing gear faults 
• Gear extension/retraction 
15. Accident (97) 
Incident (2057) 
16. Brake/anti-skid system faults 16. Accident (22) 
Incident (423) 
17. Lightning- and radiation-related avionics faults 17. Accident (1) 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Of the 370 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accidents affected by system/component 
failure/malfunction (SCFM) in the study period of 1988 to 2003, 48 percent involved the engine or fuel 
system, 31 percent involved landing gear or hydraulic failure and malfunctions, 9 percent involved flight 
control or structural failure and malfunctions, and 11 percent involved all other SCFMs. A total of 
35 percent of all the SCFM accidents were caused by improper maintenance. The leading causes of 
engine or fuel SCFM were maintenance related (39 percent), component failure (35 percent), component 
fatigue (23 percent), component separation (14 percent), manufacturing/design (11 percent), and 
component disconnected (11 percent). For flight control or structural failure events, the leading causes of 
SCFM were maintenance related (46 percent), component failure (29 percent), and manufacturing/design 
(20 percent). The leading causes of landing gear or hydraulic SCFM were component failure (48 percent), 
maintenance related (28 percent), and component fatigue (18 percent), For the “other” category 
(electrical, instrumentation/communication/navigation, anti-ice/deice system, auxiliary power unit (APU), 
cargo fire, galley, heating, oxygen, pressurization, warning systems, vacuum pump, and unknown), the 
leading causes of SCFM were maintenance related (32 percent), electrical failure (17 percent), wire 
chafed/arcing (15 percent), and electrical short (12 percent). 
A total of 7732 FAA database incidents were affected by SCFM. Of these, 33 percent involved the 
landing gear or hydraulics, 33 percent involved the engine and fuel system, while 11 percent involved the 
flight control or structural systems.  
Ninety-three percent of the aircraft primary problem incidents found in Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS) were attributed to equipment problems. The most frequent component failures were  
turbine engine, pressurization system, hydraulic main system, flight management system/flight 
management computer, and engine. The data was further categorized into aircraft systems. The 
monitoring and management system accounted for 14.1 percent of the system failures, the propulsion 
system accounted for 13.7 percent, the control surfaces accounted for 9.1 percent, and the environmental 
control accounted for 8.8 percent. Unfortunately, the propulsion system failures and malfunctions often 
were not clearly defined in the reports.  
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Appendix.—Acronyms 
ACN  incident report number 
APU  auxiliary power unit 
ASIAS  Aviation Safety Information and Analysis Sharing 
ASRS  Aviation Safety Reporting System 
ATC  air traffic control 
AvSafe  Aviation Safety Program 
EMA  electromechanical actuator 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR  Federal Aviation Regulation 
FMEA  failure modes and effects analysis 
GPWS  ground proximity warning system 
IVHM  Integrated Vehicle Health Management 
MEA  measurement and inspection technologies 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NTSB  National Transportation Safety Board 
SCFM  system/component failure/malfunction 
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